Introduction
• Capital regulation remains the centerpiece of banks' micro-and macro-prudential regulation
• Basel III has opted for:
-Increasing the quality and quantity of the capital required to banks,
-Promoting the maintenance of new regulatory buffers (capital preservation + countercyclical)
• These reforms are intended to make banks more individually and systematically resilient... and less procyclical
• Discussions about the pros and cons of this reform can be exemplified by two polar views:
1. Academics such as Admati et al. (2011) argue that: -Claims about the large costs of rising the capital requirements are unwarranted -Rising the requirements would not destroy much total value at an individual bank level and would more than compensate from an overall social welfare perspective 2. Banks and their lobbies work on different premises: -Equity financing is really more costly (& hard to access) than debt -Bank lending plays a key role in growth financing and imposing higher capital requirements will impair credit supply and real economic activity
• My objective here is to summarize two recent research papers that capture some of the frictions commonly emphasized by the banks:
-Excess cost of equity financing -Dynamic frictions affecting the accumulation/raising of equity capital by banks -Economic fluctuations & systemic shocks that may give rise to procyclical effects
• Common conclusions: 1. The socially optimal level of the capital requirements is possibly higher than the levels observed prior to this crisis 2. The positive welfare effects of introducing higher capital requirements are compatible with the prediction that their introduction may imply losses in aggregate credit & economic activity
• The papers also yield important insights regarding:
-The (lack of) desirability of (strong) countercyclical adjustments -The desirability of introducing the higher requirements in a gradual way
Paper 1 ("The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation," with R. Repullo)
• Focuses on the procyclicality induced by capital requirements in the context of a simple OLG model of relationship banking -Borrowers need loans for two consecutive periods and become dependent on initial lenders -Banks with ongoing relationships cannot issue equity (→ they only access the equity market every other period)
• Systemic risk results from banks' voluntary exposure to a rare common shock which is attractive to them
• Business/credit cycle captured as 2-state Markov chain for loans' PDs (s=l: low PD; s=h: high PD)
• Losses due to an abnormally high default rate (or an increase in the capital requirement γ s ) can produce a credit crunch
• But banks may hold (voluntary) capital buffers as a precaution
• We calibrate the model with US pre-crisis data
• Two sets of results:
1. Positive: Basel I / Basel II / Laissez-faire regime (γ=0) 2. Normative: Basel I / Basel II / Socially optimal γ s
• Social welfare = NPV of income flows -E(social cost of bank failure)
Numerical results (i)
Loan rates and capital buffers (%) -Basel II has procyclical effects: * increases rationing in s 0 = h, especially after s = l * decreases rationing in s 0 = l, especially after s = h -Unconditionally, Basel II increases expected credit rationing
Numerical results (iii)
Probabilities of bank failure (%):
1st period banks 2nd period banks • Banks extend loans to firms, financing investments that may be:
-systemic (with highly correlated failures if rare shock occurs)
-non-systemic (with low correlation failures at all times)
[Systemic lending is more profitable if shock does not realize, but unconditionally, it is less profitable → socially inefficient]
• Capital requirements cannot be made contingent on the systemic/nonsystemic nature of bank loans, because such feature is not ex ante observable to outsiders...
• Capital requirements are satisfied with the wealth that bankers accumulate via earnings retention
• Importantly, even a flat capital requirement γ can help control banks' systemic gambling incentives • However, increasing γ makes bank capital effectively scarcer at all times ⇒ less credit ⇒ lower economic activity • Variation in year-after-shock aggregates: * γ=7%: loan rate (+11.6pp), bank credit (-65%), GDP (-32%) * γ=14%: loan rate (+2.5pp), bank credit (-24%), GDP (-10%) 
Conclusions
• The explicit normative analysis of bank regulation can yield surprising results
• One does not need to minimize the importance of frictions affecting the cost (or the raising) of equity financing to find significant welfare gains associated with the reinforcement of capital requirements:
-Higher capital requirements are likely to reduce credit and GDP -But this is a price worth paying (in social welfare terms) in order to reduce bank failure probabilities & induce better ex ante risk taking decisions
• The optimal design of capital regulation calls for:
-An explicit recognition of complex trade-offs -The adoption of a proper social risk management perspective -The full consideration of dynamic issues that may be of relevance to establish * The right time for the adoption of higher requirements * The extent to which such adoption must be gradual over time * The possible need for countercyclical adjustments
